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Readers of this journal will undoubtedly be familiar with
the biblical scholarship of Robert Sacks. His commentaries on the Book of
Genesis and the Book of Job first appeared in Interpretation before being
published as books in their own right (in 1990 and 1999, respectively).1 In his
distinguished career as a teacher and scholar at St. John’s College for more
than five decades, Sacks has dedicated much of his work to a noble cause:
restoring the Bible as a worthy source of Western civilization. The project is
rooted in the belief that the well-being of the West depends on two sources,
reason and revelation. As he writes in his introduction to the commentary
on Job:
We of the Western tradition have the blessing and the curse of finding
ourselves heir to two quite different ways of life and hence to two quite
different ways of thought. Although they sit uneasily together, the
struggle between them has formed much of the life behind the growth
of both our daily language and of our highest contemplations. They
are, then, the foundation of both our deepest insights and our deep-

Robert Sacks, A Commentary on the Book of Genesis (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1990); originally serialized as “The Lion and the Ass: A Commentary on the Book of Genesis,” Interpretation
8 (1979–80): 29–101; 9 (1980–81): 1–82; 10 (1982): 67–212, 273–317; 11 (1983): 87–128, 249–74, 353–82;
12 (1984): 49–82, 141–92. Sacks, The Book of Job with Commentary: A Translation for Our Time
(Atlanta, GA: Scholars, 1999); originally serialized in Interpretation 24 (1996–97): 135–70, 251–86; 25
(1997–98): 3–36, 155–80, 293–330; 26 (1998–99): 21–64.
1
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est prejudices. As such they have given rise to that particular horizon
within which we live, and beyond which we constantly strive to peer.2

It is difficult to say which part of this statement would meet with greater skepticism among contemporary intellectuals. Many would undoubtedly reject
both philosophy and revelation as offering profound guidance to living well.
Indeed, the arguments against the Bible as a source of wisdom are so well established that they themselves form a kind of tradition.
One of the most formidable attacks on revelation, for example, Spinoza’s
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP), was published in 1670. If modern readers tend to view the Bible as a corrupt text, not “worth studying as closely as
the works of great philosophers or poets,” this impression is likely the result
of Spinoza’s critique of the Bible.3 In the TTP, Spinoza claims to have proved
conclusively that scripture is “faulty, truncated, adulterated, not consistent
with itself, that we have only fragments of it, and, finally, that the transcript
of God’s compact that he compacted with the Jews has perished.”4
One reason Spinoza’s argument is so persuasive is that he
builds his critique of scripture on his impeccable knowledge of Hebrew
grammar. The importance of grammar in Spinoza’s analysis is evident not
only in the TTP, where he presents a minitreatise on grammar beginning
in chapter 7, but also in the fact that he continued to study and write on
grammar throughout his life. He had already completed thirty-two chapters
of a work entitled Compendium grammatices linguae Hebraeae, when he
passed away prematurely at age forty-four. The unfinished work was published posthumously by his friends in 1677, but provides us a clear sense of
the importance of grammar to his overall project. The primary reason that
Spinoza devotes so much effort to Hebrew grammar is that it is a prerequisite
for a method that will provide “a full and certain knowledge” of scripture.5 In
his account, the Bible presents an unfinished compilation of sources that was
arranged so hastily that textual errors and variant readings crop up repeatedly in the manuscripts. Despite the later efforts of the Masoretes between
the fifth and tenth centuries to resolve these problems, variant readings and
grammatical irregularities remain. The real problem, for Spinoza, with this
2

Sacks, Book of Job with Commentary, ix.

Leon Kass, The Beginning of Wisdom: Reading Genesis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2003), xi.
3

4
Benedict Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, trans. Martin D. Yaffe (Newburyport, MA: Focus,
2004), 14.
5

Ibid., 91.
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situation gradually becomes clear in his treatise, namely, that the debate over
the meaning invites endless speculation and quarrels among readers:
we see almost everyone passing off his own comments as God’s word
and eager for nothing else but compelling others, under the pretext of
religion, to think as he does. We see Theologians often worried over
how they could twist their own fantasies and wishes out of Scripture
and fortify them with divine authority, and not doing anything with
less misgiving and more rashness than interpreting the Scriptures.6

The uncertainty of scripture’s literal meaning owing to its corruption encourages superstition and quarreling and obscures the simple, salutary teaching
of caritas which is essential to salvation and political stability. The TTP initiates a broad theological project to limit speculation over the meaning of
scripture. Spinoza develops a hermeneutic that considers scripture’s claims
mere reflections of the cultural background and prejudices of its authors.
But the central element of this hermeneutic is a systematic grasp of Hebrew
grammar which effectively forecloses speculation about the literal meaning
of scripture.
Because Spinoza assigns Hebrew grammar such a prominent
role in his theological-political project, he is tempted to ignore or downplay
ambiguities and grammatical irregularities in ancient Hebrew.7 He presents
ancient Hebrew as having a clear-cut, systematic, formal grammar. Some
scholars have claimed that his tendency to exaggerate the grammatical clarity of Hebrew results from his prior philosophical commitments. According
to Michael Morgan, Spinoza’s grammar “is guided. . .by his commitment to
a priori reasoning akin to that found in geometry—or, in this case, in Latin,
viewed by him as reflecting a pure, a priori structure.”8 More likely, though,
Spinoza simply wished to discourage theological speculation on the literal
meaning of scripture, and so constructed a Hebrew grammar “in an artificial
manner, [with] certain rules to the Hebrew Language that are to all appearances borrowed from Latin.”9
In sharp contrast to Spinoza’s efforts to limit the meaning
of biblical Hebrew, Sacks attempts to extend the grammatical structure of
6

Ibid., 83.

Cf. Ze’ev Levy, “The Problem of Normativity in Spinoza’s Hebrew Grammar,” in Studia Spinozana,
vol. 3 (Hanover: Walther & Walther Verlag, 1987), 388.
7

8
Michael L. Morgan, editor’s introduction, in Spinoza: Complete Works, ed. Morgan (Indianapolis,
IN: Hackett, 2002), 585.
9

Levy, “Problem of Normativity,” 369.
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Hebrew historically to include the ancient Semitic languages, from Akkadian
to Ugaritic. According to Sacks, “the Semitic languages form a much more
closely interrelated group than do the Indo-European languages. It would be
appropriate to think of the Semitic languages as comparable to the Romance
languages in terms of their proximity” (3). Many of these languages are more
ancient than Hebrew, and preserve more ancient forms of grammar and
meaning. As such, they offer valuable clues to the origins and development
of Hebrew.
But Sacks extends the scope of Hebrew grammar in an even
more fundamental way. Traditional or formal grammars view the structure
and rules of language as abstract, given facts. This is a sensible approach when
the objective is the acquisition of language. Speculating on the development
of language or relation of grammar to the thoughts of past generations might
distract a student from the task of learning the rudiments of a language. But
the unavoidable consequence of those introductory grammars is that they
leave the student with the impression that Hebrew presents a permanent set
of grammatical forms that express a fixed conceptual world. Sacks laments
this situation and compares formal grammar to a child who has lost the
ability to decipher meaning in art: “imagine a child born into the world in
which abstract art had so taken over the field that the child would no longer be aware of the possibility of representational art. Like those islanders
who, we are told, cannot recognize a picture as a picture, the child might
find Rembrandt’s self-portrait a beautiful and well-balanced combination of
colors—no more and no less” (2). Formal grammar is particularly inadequate
for the study of biblical Hebrew because it ignores its development and so
limits its meaning in artificial ways. In the case of Spinoza at least, the formal
character of his Hebrew grammar was the product of a conscious effort to
resolve a theological-political problem. Formal grammar, to the contrary,
is characterized by its forgetfulness of the origins and meaning of beautiful
forms. It accomplishes the same thing as Spinoza’s grammar by inuring us to
the ancestral thoughts embedded in language (cf. 30).
Sacks’s intentional grammar does not ignore the formal
rules, but rather focuses on their development in relation to the people
who sought language to express logos. In offering a definition of a noun, for
example, Sacks does not merely provide a synonym. An example of this sort
of analysis—in fact, the example which inspired Sacks to pursue this nontraditional approach to grammar—is the participle of the verb “to speak,”
medaber. A formal grammar would simply define the word as an established
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fact. But Sacks’s teacher once pointed out to him that it is likely a construct
from the Hebrew words mi and dabar; that is, literally medaber means “he
who speaks.” Once we recognize that words have histories that reflect the
intentions and thoughts of their speakers, the study of grammar becomes an
investigation into the development of thought itself. This approach to grammar, which invites us “to rethink the position of the person who possessed
the verb and needed the noun,” opens up a new path for biblical study (3).
Sacks concedes that the title of his book, Beginning Biblical
Hebrew, is a bit misleading. If the reader expects an introduction to formal
grammar, he may be a bit perplexed by the organization of the work. Topics that would appear at the beginning of a traditional grammar appear
later in Sacks’s work. For example, the ordinal numbers are not introduced
until chapter 13; prepositions are not covered until chapter 19. In addition,
although there is a brief introduction to some grammatical rules, the book
is devoted to a careful reading of a single chapter (chapter 21) of the First
Book of Samuel. The reason for these idiosyncrasies is that Sacks intends to
introduce readers to an intentional approach to grammar, a subject that cannot be taught directly but must be observed: “Intentional grammar is not and
cannot become a subject matter. It cannot be taught: a book can do no more
than invite the reader to participate in the activity” (3).
One reason that Sacks’s approach to language cannot be
taught is that it lacks a single, concrete method for arriving at linguistic certainty, nor can we arrive at a clear account of the origins of language. And
“if we do not know where language begins,” Sacks asks, “how shall we know
where we should begin?” If various languages shared elements of a common
grammatical structure or vocabulary, then we could point to its natural
origins and craft a method, like Euclid, with precise definitions, postulates,
and axioms (1). But while language points at times to a common origin, the
profound grammatical differences between languages frustrate our quest for
quasimathematical certainty. What is worse, the pursuit of such certainty
comes at the cost of destroying or ignoring the very phenomena we are trying
to capture. The conceptual world behind language and our awareness of such
history “imperceptibly shade off into the vaguely remembered and the dimly
seen.” In light of this terrain, Sacks says, “we have no other choice than to try
to make the thoughts and the half-dead expressions that inhabit the morgue
of our minds live again—not because they are true, but because they remain a
part of us and yet are only intelligible in their living state” (171). The evidence
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for the thoughts of the ancients oftentimes is no more than a “scrap” that jogs
“some reminiscence” of logos (164).
Although intentional grammar is more elusive than formal
grammar, Sacks takes great pains as a teacher to gently guide his readers. He
outlines the scholarly controversies over the development of Hebrew grammar, recommends further reading, and even offers helpful tips for using a
lexicon (145). He encourages readers in the light of formidable difficulties and
reassures them to keep searching even in unpromising terrain. In considering
whether prepositions emerged from nouns or verbs, he observes: “Even if it
should prove impossible to recoup those ancient thoughts which still remain
part of us, such scraps as these may help a little to jog some reminiscence of
what it meant to participate in the passage from noun to preposition and the
dawning of a new way of thought” (163–64). At the end of this passage, Sacks
tells his readers that he has done his best to begin the investigation, “to think
the transition through.”
More fundamentally, Sacks repeatedly reminds us that we
can never be certain of the origins of language, and so must always approach
it with wonder. Beginning Biblical Hebrew is an introduction in the sense
that it urges us to return to the beginnings, to wonder about the origins of
grammatical structures and the meaning of words. In his discussion of the
word nefesh, for example, Sacks resists telling us the traditional definition
of “soul.” Instead he shares the relevant data: the Akkadian origins of the
word, the diverse meanings of the term in ancient Hebrew, its various uses
in the Bible. The point is to invite readers to ponder the original concept that
Hebrews sought to convey. His conclusion is simply an invitation to think: “I
hesitate to offer a definition of the word nefesh, but will instead leave you to
the dictionaries and to your own reflections” (82).
These few examples suffice to indicate that Sacks’s objective
concerns more than supplementing the defects of modern linguistics. Intentional grammar aims at rediscovering ancient thought buried in modern
grammar, and the first step is scrutinizing “our own speech and our present ways of thinking” (171). In his discussion of the preposition “of,” Sacks
observes that it is natural for us to simply accept prepositions as a natural
part of our grammar and as entirely consistent with our experience in the
world. But prepositions “are arrived at by human thought. That means that
an act of human thought lies within our own daily speech and modes of
thinking which we ourselves have never thought. To that extent we lack selfunderstanding. It is this situation that makes it necessary for us to go back
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with such care in order to get a clearer glimpse of ourselves, and of the things
that we thoughtfully take for granted” (70).
Language provides us a handy set of concepts for organizing
the world that we tend to accept without further scrutiny. We have inherited
prepositions, but we can appropriate them only “by thinking through the
gap between its present formality and those antique feelings which were its
progenitors” (122). Sacks’s suggestion is that in order to examine ourselves
honestly, we need to excavate the thought behind our concepts, to rediscover
“the archaic process of thinking” (86). Intentional grammar in this sense is a
prerequisite not only for studying revelation, but also for philosophy.
Whereas Spinoza’s method closes off scripture as a source of
wisdom, Sacks’s method has the very opposite effect. Consider the example
of the notational accents, or ta’amim, which appear above and below letters in
scripture. These markings do not appear to operate according to fixed rules.
Nor is it clear whether their function is to indicate tone or grammar. Are they
intended to signify pitch, emotional states, inflections, attitudes? Are they
primarily musical or grammatical markers? Because they elude fixed rules
of usage, Spinoza urges us to abandon the attempt to find meaning in them,
by suggesting instead that they have become hopelessly corrupted over time.
He also rejects the idea that everything in scripture has meaning, let alone
infinitely many profound meanings.10 Sacks suggests an alternative: it may
be the case that the ta’amim have become corrupt, but we cannot determine
this until we make an investigation. In one of the most striking sections of
his book, he sets out to discover their purpose in a Socratic spirit: “the secret
of such investigations is to be as naïve as possible and not to fear spelling out
the obvious” (102). His investigation leads him to reflect upon the relation of
language and music, and the differences between Western and biblical musical notation and grammar. Despite his findings, however, he does not rule out
the possibility that Spinoza may have been right; instead, he urges us to carry
on the investigation.
Sacks does not venerate the ancients simply because of
their age, nor does he take progress for granted and assume the superiority
of the moderns. Rather, he seeks to clarify the difference because we have
inherited the ancient world in our language. If we wish to know ourselves,
and ultimately the truth of things, we cannot avoid exploring the history of
logos despite the fact that it is deeply hidden in language. When he explores
10

Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, 140.
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the Hebrew term for “time,” Sacks notes how the word evolved from the
notion of a special occasion to the more modern notion of magnitude, that
is, the view of time we have inherited: “This new concept of time as a magnitude, like other keystones of the modern world, has buried itself within our
consciousness and now masquerades as part of our nature; but it was not
always so” (144).
Sacks’s approach to grammar will remind readers of his
approach to the biblical text, particularly his rejection of method as a starting
point. This is hardly an accident; in fact, his grammar predates the study
of revelation. He admits that “the bulk” of Beginning Biblical Hebrew was
written nearly forty years ago (171). The search for linguistic intentionality
is an essential part of his approach to scripture. Both approaches cannot be
considered “methods” because they are characterized by their awareness that
we do not yet know the nature of revelation. Sacks’s approach to both grammar and scripture is characterized by this openness:
Of recent times it has become the custom to preface any work of this
nature with a discourse concerning Methods of Interpretation, and yet
it is difficult to see how that can be done. To do so would presuppose
that we already know how to read the book before we begin. Unfortunately that is untrue. Each book has its own way about it, and generally
we begin to learn how to read a book by stumbling around in it for a
very long time until we find our way. Otherwise we risk the danger
of reading the book by a method foreign to the intent of the author.11

In the case of revelation, Sacks urges to proceed with caution. In the absence
of a method, we cannot be sure whether we are discovering something real
or imagining it to be so. Even as we start to uncover a sense of the whole, this
is only a “minor guarantee” that we have discovered something about the
origins, or the intentions of the author.
In fact, Sacks’s interpretation of the Hebrew Bible does point
us toward a central theme, namely, God’s attempt to guide men toward the
highest good despite the ongoing resistance of creation, both earth and man,
to this education. Sacks describes this education in terms of lifting human
desires toward the good as “the New Way.”12 But the story is hardly straightforward and does not proceed in a linear fashion. As one reader explains, “the
11

Sacks, Commentary on the Book of Genesis, ii.

See ibid., 11–12, 65–67, 73, 77–81, 86, 103, 123, 205, 209, 214, 220, 224–25, 230–32, 270, 276, 285–86,
296, 300, 336–38, 353, 379, 390, 396, 398, 410, 428. See also Martin D. Yaffe, Judaism and Environmental Ethics: A Reader (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 20–23.
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book of Genesis tells the story of this lifting, but only by constant references
backward upon itself and forward to other incidents in the history of Israel.
The constant interweaving of past, present, and future, and the constant
forgetting and remembering that such weaving creates, are the material of
Genesis, which cannot be understood apart from the other books.”13 Similarly Sacks’s analysis of Hebrew grammar points us to striking insights into
subjects as diverse as causality, intellect, plurality, will, personal identity,
and time. It is hard to deny that Sacks is on to something, even though it is
difficult to verify his findings with quasi-mathematical certainty. In fact,
the virtue of Sacks’s method is that its conscious openness to any and all
difficulties encountered in the quest to discover meaning ennobles that quest
by allowing readers to avoid dogmatic claims to knowledge and to return
again and again to the text.
We began with Sacks’s observation that reason and revelation are the dual sources of Western civilization, and like Jacob and Esau,
“they sit uneasily together.”14 This uneasiness is hard to deny, yet also easy to
exaggerate. In his efforts to promote political stability, for example, Spinoza
suggests that reason and revelation will have nothing to do with each other.
Efforts to reconcile them lead invariably to the assertion of the superiority
of one over the other. He notes in chapter 15 of the TTP that such efforts
usually lead to either dogmatic belief, which rejects reason altogether, or dogmatic rationalism, which always attempts to subordinate revelation to reason.
Spinoza suggests, therefore, that the two be permanently separated. But this
means that revelation can make no claims to the truth, and that reason must
sometimes defer to revelation despite the absence of truth. Both options are
unattractive. The achievement of Robert Sacks is to suggest an alternative
which, though not an ultimate solution, allows the two protagonists to sit—
albeit uneasily—together. As we have seen, his critical innovation is a method
that allows one to approach scripture as a serious guide to a flourishing life
without succumbing to dogmatic belief. This solution may have been suggested to him by one of his teachers, Leo Strauss, who pointed out:
If orthodoxy claims to know that the Bible is divinely revealed, that
every word of the Bible is divinely inspired, that Moses was the writer
of the Pentateuch, that the miracles recorded in the Bible have happened and similar things, Spinoza has refuted orthodoxy. But the case
Clarke Cochran, “Political Science Confronts the Book: Recent Work on Scripture and Politics,”
Journal of Politics 50 (1988): 222.
13

14
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is entirely different if orthodoxy limits itself to asserting that it believes
the aforementioned things, i.e., that they cannot claim to possess the
binding power peculiar to the known. For all assertions of orthodoxy
rest on the irrefutable premise that the omnipotent God whose will is
unfathomable, whose ways are not our ways, who has decided to dwell
in the thick darkness, may exist.15

Through his commentaries on the Bible and his Beginning Biblical Hebrew,
Sacks offers us an alternative to the dogmatic acceptance of revelation, a
position that inevitably undermines reason. He helps us to see that the quest
for understanding revelation involves reason and can never abandon it. In
doing so, Sacks’s approach contributes significantly to the reinvigoration of
revelation as a noble source of Western civilization.

Leo Strauss, “Preface” to the English translation of Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (New York:
Schocken Books, 1965), 28.
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